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CASE COMMENTS
denied the advantages of the recent Supreme Court decisions, the
burden will be diminished and the discrimination or inequality
of justice will be reduced once the docket is brought up to date.
Furthermore, once adequate standards are established, the num-
ber of appeals should be greatly reduced below the current level.
As a matter of social policy this decision is undoubtedly of
great value. Efforts to bring the poor into the mainstream of
American life and integrate them into the vast body of the middle
class is a primary goal of the law. Giving the poor greater
equality before the law will help to do this, for nothing could be
more calculated to ostracize the poor or minority groups than
inequitable treatment resulting from the inability to afford
counsel. The rule of this case must be adopted and further ex-
tended to include the later phase of preparing the motion for
collateral attack.
Constitutional Law: State Residence Requirements
for Welfare Aid Held Unconstitutional
Plaintiff, an indigent mother, moved from Boston, Massa-
chusetts, to Hartford, Connecticut, in order to live near her
mother. Because of her change in residence, Boston discontinued
the welfare payments which she had been receiving.' Her appli-
cation for similar aid in Connecticut was denied because she had
not met that state's one-year residence requirement which applies
to all persons entering the state without visible means of support
for the immediate future.2 On her challenge of the statute, the
federal district court held the one-year residence requirement
unconstitutional because it abridged the right to travel through
a state and to establish a residence therein, in violation of the
privileges and immunities clause of the fourteenth amendment,
and because it denied equal protection of the laws in violation of
the fourteenth amendment. Thompson v. Shapiro, 270 F. Supp.
331 (D. Conn. 1967).
1. Plaintiff had been receiving benefits under the Aid to De-
pendent Children (ADC) program in Boston. ADC programs are fi-
nanced jointly by the state and federal governments, with each con-
tributing about one-half the cost. See generally Harvith, The Constitu-
tionality of Residence Tests for General and Categorical Assistance
Programs, 54 CALrT. L. REv. 567 (1966).
2. CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17 (Supp. 1966). The Connecticut
State Welfare Department defines the words "without visible means
of support for the immediate future" as:
1. Persons or families who arrive in Connecticut without spe-
cific employment.
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On a challenge of a similar statute in 1940 in People ex rel.
Heydenreich v. Lyons,3 the Illinois Supreme Court held valid
a three-year residence requirement for applicants for public
assistance. The opinion concluded that since a state has no con-
stitutional or common law obligation to provide public benefits,
it has wide discretion in setting conditions for its distribution.4
The court rejected the argument that the statute denied equal
protection of the laws, stating that the fourteenth amendment
required only that such a classification be reasonably related to a
legitimate purpose.5 The legitimate purpose was found to be an
attempt to prevent the state ". . . from becoming a haven of the
transient poor seeking the most advantageous statutory provi-
sion granted those requiring assistance and, perhaps, thereby re-
ducing the aid to which permanent residents of Illinois should
justly have first claim .... ,,6 The three-year residence require-
ment was held to be reasonably related to this purpose.
A New York case7 of the same vintage, where a removal
statutes was challenged as unconstitutional, is relevant to the
question of the validity of residence requirements since it also
involved unequal treatment of certain citizens on the ground
that they were new arrivals as opposed to permanent residents.
The majority dismissed the appeal for procedural reasons,9 but a
2. Those arriving without regular income or resources sufficient
to enable the family to be self-supporting in accordance with
Standards of Public Assistance.
3. "Immediate future" means within three months after arriv-
ing in Connecticut.
[Support from others does not satisfy the requirements of
the law.]
270 F. Supp. at 333.
3. 374 Ill. 557, 30 N.E.2d 46 (1940), noted in 8 U. CIm. L. REV. 544
(1941). Several other suits have been brought in the past year chal-
lenging similar statutes. See Green v. Department of Pub. Welfare,
Civil No. 3349 (D. Del., June 28, 1967) (statute unconstitutional); Har-
rell v. Board of Comm'rs, Civil No. 1497-67 (D.D.C., June 19, 1967) (plain-
tiff's challenge not considered). Cases pending on the same issue in-
clude Alexander v. California Dep't of Social Welfare, Civil No. 47041
(N.D. Cal., filed May 10, 1967); Barley v. Board of Comm'rs, Civil No.
1579-67 (D.D.C., filed June 20, 1967); Smith v. Reynolds, Civil No. 42419
(E.D. Pa., filed June 1, 1967); Waggoner v. Gunderman, Civil No. 67-40
(W.D. Pa., Jan. 1967).
4. 374 Ill. at 565, 30 N.E.2d at 51; see also 8 U. CHi. L. REv. 544
(1941).
5. 374 Ill. at 564, 30 N.E.2d at 51.
6. Id. at 566, 30 N.E.2d at 51.
7. In re Chirillo, 283 N.Y. 417, 28 N.E.2d 895 (1940).
8. The statute allowed New York to "remove" petitioner to his
former place of residence in Ohio because he was a burden on the New
York welfare program. Id.
9. The court held that where, as here, the intent and scope of
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three-judge minority would have allowed the appeal and sus-
tained the constitutionality of the statute. The minority rejected
arguments that the statute violated the fourteenth amendment,
stating that the due process clause of that amendment required
only reasonableness.1 o
Prior to Heydenreich, several cases in analogous areas held
that freedom of interstate travel is constitutionally protected,:"
although the courts are not in agreement as to the source of that
right. Accordingly several types of restrictions on interstate
travel have been struck down. In Edwards v. California,12 the
Court found that since the movement of people is "commerce"
within the meaning of the commerce clause,13 freedom of travel
is derived from that clause and cannot be abridged by the states.
Thus the Court struck down a state statute making it a misde-
meanor to knowingly bring an indigent nonresident into the
state. The Court further reasoned that the national character of
the union required that no state be allowed to isolate itself from
the national problem of aid to the poor.' 4  Four justices con-
curred on the ground that freedom of travel was a right of na-
tional citizenship and was therefore protected by the privileges
and immunities clause of the fourteenth amendment. 5
In several cases involving passports, the Supreme Court has
further established that the right to travel is constitutionally
protected and has provided at least a partial answer to the ques-
tion of what type of statute or regulation unconstitutionally re-
the statute as well as its constitutionality were involved, a direct appeal
on constitutional grounds from the County Court was improper. Id.
10. Id. at 431-32, 28 N.E.2d at 901. The minority felt that the
historical background and present conditions showed the need for, and
reasonableness of, the statute. Furthermore, it was the minority's posi-
tion that the equal protection clause was not violated because all per-
sons receiving public benefits were supported equally; and the privi-
leges and immunities clause was not violated since the statute did not
prevent a person from coming into the state but applied only when he
sought public benefits. Id. at 432-38, 30 N.E.2d at 901-04.
11. Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1867) (state tax on
each person leaving the state by common carrier struck down); Passenger
Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283 (1849) (state statutes imposing taxes on
arriving alien passengers invalid under commerce clause).
12. 314 U.S. 160 (1941).
13. Id. at 172. See Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 491
(1917).
14. 314 U.S. at 174-75.
15. Id. at 178, 182. Privileges and immunities derived from na-
tional citizenship are protected by the fourteenth amendment, while
those derived from state citizenship are not. Slaughter-House Cases,
83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 74 (1872).
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stricts that right. In Kent v. Dulles,16 the Secretary of State
denied passports to persons who re:-used to file affidavits dis-
avowing alleged Communistic beliefs and associations. The Court
did not reach the constitutional issue of whether Congress can
deny a person the right to travel because of his beliefs and asso-
ciations, since it held that Congress had clearly not delegated
such power to the Secretary 7 by the statutes' 8 in question. How-
ever, the Court did comment that "[t] he right to travel is a part
of the 'liberty' of which the citizen cannot be deprived without
due process of law. ... "I"
In another passport case, Aptheker v. Secretary of State,20
the Court again found the basis of the right to travel to be the
"liberty" guaranteed by the fifth amendment. Reaching the con-
stitutional issue directly, the Court struck down section 6 of the
Subversive Controls Act of 19 5 02L which made it unlaw-
ful for any member of a Communist organization to apply for or
use a passport. The Court held that the Act was too broad and
indiscriminate in its restriction of the right to travel, and violated
the fifth amendment in that it applied without regard to whether
the accused knew or believed that he was associated with a Com-
munist organization.22
Kent and Aptheker were modified by Zemel v. Rusk,23 which
upheld a State Department ban on travel to Cuba.24 The Court
stated that the fact that freedom of travel cannot be abridged
without due process of law as required by the fifth amendment
does not mean that it cannot be abridged under any circum-
stances. In a dissenting opinion, Justice Douglas argued that
first amendment freedoms of speech amd association suffer if the
16. 357 U.S. 116 (1958).
17. The Court held that the Secretary of State was authorized
under the Act to restrict passports only for reasons relating to the
applicant's citizenship or his participation in an unlawful activity;
since the grounds asserted by the Secretary did not fall within these
two categories, the Act provided the secretary with no power to impose
such a restriction. 375 U.S. at 127.
18. 22 U.S.C. § 211(a) (1964); 8 U.S.C. § 1185 (1964).
19. 357 U.S. at 125.
20. 378 U.S. 500 (1964).
21. 50 U.S.C. § 785 (1964).
22. 378 U.S. at 510.
23. 381 U.S. 1 (1965).
24. Passport Act of 1926, 22 U.S.C. § 211(a) (1964), states that:
"The Secretary of State may grant and issue passports . . .under such
rules as the President shall designate and prescribe for and on behalf
of the United States. . . ." The Court held that prohibition of travel to
Cuba by the Executive was within the rulemaking power granted by
this Act. 381 U.S. at 7.
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freedom of travel is abridged. Therefore, no restriction upon
travel should stand unless a clear countervailing national inter-
est can be demonstrated.
25
In the recent case of United States v. Guest,26 the Court held
that the right of free travel is protected from infringement by
individuals as well as governments, when it sustained the con-
victions of six individuals for conspiring to deprive Negroes of
their constitutional right to travel among the states.27 The Court
stated that while there have been differences in emphasis within
the Court as to the source of the right to travel, there has been
no disagreement as to the existence of such a federal right, inde-
pendent of the fourteenth amendment; therefore, state action
need not be shown. 2s
While the above cases establish that the right to travel is
constitutionally protected, they do not consider the issue of
whether residence requirements constitute an abridgement of
that right. Several cases in which residence requirements have
been upheld in relation to voting eligibility indicate that at least
some residence requirements are not considered to be such an
abridgement. In Lassiter v. North-Hampton County Board of
Elections,29 the court indicated that a residence requirement is
an obvious example of the type of factor which a state may con-
sider in determining qualifications of a voter.3 0 The argument
25. Id. at 26. Where first amendment freedoms are involved, even
a legitimate governmental purpose cannot be pursued by means which
broadly stifle individual liberties when employment of a narrower
statute can achieve the same purpose. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479,
488 (1960). See also NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963); Sala v.
New York, 334 U.S. 558 (1948); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296
(1940).
26. 383 U.S. 745 (1966).
27. The indictment charged defendants with conspiring to deprive
Negroes of their right to travel and use instrumentalities of interstate
commerce by shooting, beating, and killing Negroes, and by other forms
of violence and threats of violence. Id. at 748.
28. Id. at 757. The Articles of Confederation expressly protected
freedom of travel, stating that ". . . the people of each state shall have
free ingress and regress to and from any other state .... " The Consti-
tution however, makes no mention of "free ingress and regress." One
writer concludes that the draftsmen of the Constitution left the phrase
out because it was considered to be embodied in substance elsewhere
in the Constitution. He states that in view of the draftsmen's opposition
to state tariff and immigration laws, it is clear that they did not intend
to reject the substance of the phrase. Z. CmAFEE, THaE= HmwN
RIGHTS IN THE CoNsTiTuTio OF 1787, at 185 (1956).
29. 360 U.S. 45 (1959).
30. Id. at 51 (dicta). See also Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649
(1944).
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that a one-year residence requirement for voting in a local elec-
tion is a denial of equal protection under article IV, section 231
was rejected in Drueding v. Devlin.32 The right to vote in na-
tional elections, which has its foundation in the Federal Consti-
tution,33 may also be conditioned on a fixed period of residence.
34
In addition, residence requirements have been upheld in relation
to divorce jurisdiction3 5 and university admission and tui-
tion.3 6  The above cases thus indicate that residence require-
ments are not within the class o:l restrictions prohibited as
abridgements of free travel.
In the instant case the State argued that the plaintiff was
not deprived of her right to travel and settle3 7 in Connecticut
since she could do so freely, on the condition that she would be
ineligible for welfare benefits for one year. The residence re-
quirement was therefore valid, because it was reasonably related
to the legitimate legislative purpose of protecting the state wel-
fare fund by discouraging the influx of those who enter the
state seeking public benefits.
The court, however, agreed with the plaintiff that Connecti-
cut's residence requirement was unconstitutionally discrimina-
tory, because it arbitrarily classified persons who had recently
moved to the state as ineligible for aid.38 The court adopted the
rationale of Justice Jackson's concurring opinion in Edwards30
that a restriction of free travel abridges the privileges and im-
munities clause of the fourteenth amendment,40 and that no
31. Article IV, § 2, states that "[tJhe Citizens of each State shall
be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several
States."
32. 234 F. Supp. 721 (D. Md. 1964), aff'd, 380 U.S. 125 (1965).
33. Joyner v. Browning, 30 F. Supp. 512, 517 (W.D. Tenn. 1939);
see also Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908); Wiley v. Sinkler, 179
U.S. 58, (1900); Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651 (1884).
34. Van Berkel v. Power, 16 N.Y.2d 37, 209 N.E.2d 539, 261 N.Y.S.2d
876 (1965); State ex rel. Englehard v. 'Weber, 96 Minn. 422, 105 N.W.
490 (1905).
35. See, e.g., Stewart v. Stewart, 185 F.2d 436 (D.C. Cir. 1950);
Gage v. Gage, 89 F. Supp. 987 (D.D.C. 1950); Clark v. Clark, 79 F. Supp.
722 (D.D.C. 1948); Lorance v. Lorance, 216 Ga. 754, 119 S.E.2d 342
(1961); Gramelspacher v. Gramelspacher, 204 Va. 839, 134 S.E.2d 285
(1964).
36. Meredith v. Fair, 199 F. Supp. 754 (S.D. Miss. 1961).
37. The State apparently conceded that the right to travel includes
the right to establish residence in a state. 270 F. Supp. at 335.
38. 270 F. Supp. at 338.
39. 314 U.S. 160, 181-86 (1941) (concurring opinion).
40. 270 F. Supp. at 335-36. The court held that plaintiff's reliance
on the privileges and immunities clause of art. IV, § 2 was misplaced,
since plaintiff was a citizen of Connecticut. Article IV, § 2 prevents
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measure which would restrict one's freedom of travel on the
basis of poverty can be upheld as constitutional. The court
clearly defined freedom of travel to include the right to establish
a residence within a state as well as to pass through it41 In addi-
tion the court cited the passport cases of Zemel, Aptheker, and
Kent in support of its holding that restrictions on freedom of
travel violate the Constitution.4
The court conceded that prior "right to travel cases" in-
volved absolute proscriptions on travel, but reasoned that Guest43
had established that the discouragement of interstate travel was
also prohibited. The court cited Dombrowski v. Pfister 4 4 and
Wolff v. Selective Service Local Board No. 16,45 which held un-
constitutional actions which had a "chilling" effect on first
amendment freedoms, in further support of its holding that free-
dom of travel includes the right to be free from discouragement
against travel. The court then concluded that since the one-year
residence requirement for eligibility for ADC has a chilling effect
upon this right, it was as unconstitutional as an outright pro-
hibition would be.
In an alternative holding the court rejected the foundation
of the Lyons decision,46 that a state may impose residence re-
quirements on applicants for aid because receipt thereof is a
privilege and not a right, reasoning that Sherbert v. Verner47 had
established that even gratuitous state benefits must satisfy
only discrimination by a state against citizens of other states in favor of
its own citizens. Id. at 334.
41. Id. at 336. The court quoted Jackson's statement in Edwards
that freedom of travel includes the right ". . to enter any state of the
Union, either for temporary sojourn or for the establishment of per-
manent residence therein ... " 314 U.S. 160, 183 (1941) (concurring
opinion).
42. 270 F. Supp. at 335.
43. 383 U.S. 745 (1966).
44. 380 U.S. 479 (1965). The Court enjoined certain state officials
from harassing plaintiff because of his political beliefs. The officials
were bringing charges against him under the Louisiana Subversive Ac-
tivities and Communist Control Law, with no real expectation of a
successful conviction, on the ground that these actions discouraged ex-
ercise of freedoms of speech and association.
45. 372 F.2d 817 (2d Cir. 1967). The court held that reclassifi-
cation of students from "deferred" to "available for service" status on
the basis of their participation in antiwar demonstrations was uncon-
stitutional. Here again the court's decision was based on the detrimen-
tal effect these actions may have on free speech.
46. Notes 3-6 supra and accompanying text.
47. 374 U.S. 398 (1963). The Court held that unemployment com-
pensation could not be denied to plaintiff for her refusal to work on
Saturday, the Sabbath day of her religion. Id. at 406.
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equal protection requirements.48 The court stated that the
statute was not reasonably related to the purpose of discouraging
entry of those who enter the state for the purpose of seeking
public benefits, since the state had not shown that a significant
number came for that purpose. Most of the class entering the
state came to seek employment, to return after a period of ab-
sence, or, as in the instant case, to live near relatives. Moreover,
the classification based on a one-year residence, a job, or a cash
stake was arbitrary and unreasonable, because the state had not
shown that persons with a job or a cash stake would be less of a
burden on the state in the long rum.49 Therefore, the statute
denied plaintiff the equal protection of the laws.
The court went much further ir dicta, stating that even if
the statute had been shown to serve a reasonable purpose, it
would have been unconstitutional. 50 While a state may restrict
distribution of aid in some ways, it ". . . must justify its denial to
others by reference to a constitutionally recognized reason.'51
The dissent argued that the residence requirement was a
classification reasonably related to the legislative purpose of dis-
couraging ingress to the state by those who enter for the primary
purpose of seeking relief and was therefore within the power of
the state to enact.52 It pointed out that forty state legislatures
and Congress have approved similar one-year residence require-
ments as a prerequisite for welfare benefits. The existence of
residence requirements in areas such as student loans, aid to the
blind, voting, liquor permits, state civil service employment, di-
vorce actions, and commercial fishing licenses were offered by
the dissent as evidence that such requirements have widespread
legislative approval and have heretofore been accepted as valid
48. 270 F. Supp. at 338.
49. The Act provided that one whc arrived in the state with spe-
cific employment or resources sufficient to enable the family to be
self-supporting was not subject to the one year requirement.
50. 270 F. Supp. at 338. The court stated that "[elven a classifica-
tion denying aid to those whose sole or principal purpose in entry is to
seek aid ... would not be sustainable."
51. Id. The court stated that if the resident requirement were for
the purpose of preventing fraud, investigation of indigency, or some other
reasonable administrative need, it would be valid. However, the state
concluded that the residence requirement was not needed for these
purposes.
52. The dissent pointed out that Connecticut provides benefits of
$197.00 per month for a family of four, compared to $33.00 per month in
Mississippi, $48.00 in Alabama, and a national average of $148.00. Con-
necticut pays 54% of its total with the federal government contributing
the remaining 46%, while four southern states contribute an average of
only 17%. Id. at 339.
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by courts. A declaration that such legislative enactments are in-
valid ".... would go far toward completing the annihilation of
the police powers .... -53
While the court's finding that the right of free travel is
one of the privileges and immunities of national citizenship pro-
tected from state abridgement by the fourteenth amendment and
that freedom of travel includes the right to establish residence
within a state cannot be seriously questioned,5 4 the real issue is
whether the type of indirect effect upon free travel caused by
the residence requirement is constitutionally prohibited. No
previous case has held such an indirect effect on free travel to be
an "abridgement" of that right, nor has any prior case held that a
state has a constitutional duty to provide optimal conditions for
migration into it.
The court's reliance on Edwards and Guest is misplaced.
While Edwards does make clear that no state can prohibit or
make unlawful travel between the states, it does not condenm
all legislative action which may make entry into a state less ad-
vantageous than it might otherwise have been. Nor did Guest
involve discouragement tactics which were as indirect as in the
instant case. Guest involved the shooting and killing of persons
as they used interstate highways, but it did not consider the
question of what type of indirect restrictions constitute an
abridgement of free travel.55
The court's reliance on Dombrowski and Wolff is also very
tenuous. Both cases involved the use of otherwise valid pro-
cedures to "punish" persons for their exercise of first amendment
freedoms. 6 The punishment of a person who has exercised his
constitutional right to travel to and settle in Connecticut is
clearly not the purpose of the statute.57
53. Id. at 340.
54. See Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941); United States v.
Wheeler, 254 U.S. 281 (1920); Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908).
55. 383 U.S. 745, 760 (1966). See notes 25-26 supra and accom-
panying text.
56. In Dombrouski, the Court noted that first amendment rights
are particularly sensitive to discouragement or "chilling." 380 U.S. 479,
486-87 (1965). See also NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963); Tugwell
v. 'Bush, 367 U.S. 907 (1961) (per curiam), affirming Bush v. Orleans
Parish School Bd., 194 F. Supp. 182 (E.D. La. 1961); Gremillion v.
United States, 368 U.S. 11 (1961) (per curiam).
57. See note 2 supra and accompanying text. The fact that public
benefits do become available one year after a new resident's arrival
shows that the statute is not intended to and does not operate to
"punish" persons for exercising their right to travel.
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The majority's position is further weakened by its failure
to discuss the effect of Congress' implicit approval of the one-
year residence requirement in the Federal Social Security Laws,5 8
which provides federal funds to state administered welfare pro-
grams on the condition that the residence requirement does not
exceed one year. Since forty states require one year of residence
for eligibility, 59 congressional approval of such statutes can
hardly be questioned.60
Finally, the alternative holding of the court was a misappli-
cation of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment. Equal protection requires only that the group affected be
classified on a basis reasonably related to a valid legislative ob-
jective. The objective of the residence statute is not merely to
protect the public purse, but to provide an adequate welfare pro-
gram for permanent Connecticut citizens. To this end, it is rea-
sonable for a state to give preference to permanent residents as
opposed to newly arrived citizens (who have not resided in the
state for one year), for the purpose of preventing the fund avail-
able for permanent residents from being diminished by new ar-
rivals.61 It is not asking too much of an applicant for public
benefits that he first "contribute" one year of citizenship within
the state before he becomes eligible to receive such benefits.
The nature of the federal system requires that residence tests
be allowed; each state must have the right to create a welfare
program primarily for its own permanent residents with safe-
guards against an influx of persons seeking benefits of the pro-
gram. In the absence of a federal program to deal with newly
arrived residents otherwise eligible for welfare benefits, state
residence requirements must be upheld.
58. 42 U.S.C. § 602(b) (1964).
59. U.S. Gov'T PRINTING OFFICE, CHARACTERISTICS OF STATE PUBLIC
ASSISTANCE PLANS UNDER THE SOCIAL SEcURI ACT (1965).
60. The court might have construed the statute to exclude from
eligibility only those whose primary purpose in coming to the state was
to seek welfare benefits. However, while the court did not give the
statute that construction, it did state in dicta that even a statute so
construed would be unconstitutional. 270 F. Supp. 338.
61. It is obvious that states with generous benefits programs
would suffer by attracting persons from other states seeking higher
benefits, and states with very inadequate programs would "gain" by
having some welfare recipients move to states with better programs.
This would, of course, encourage states with high welfare payments to
decrease such payments to prevent an influx of persons, and encourage
states with low benefits to maintain them at a low level to encourage
welfare recipients to move to states with higher benefits. Welfare bene-
fits would be the prime victims of this result.
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